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Multiple equilibrium overnight rates in a dynamic interbank market game 1
Introduction
Central banks normally use the average overnight interbank market rate (the EONIA rate in the European monetary union, the Fed funds rate in the US) as an indicator for the liquidity situation at the interbank market. If the rate is high, the market is assumed to expect a liquidity deÞcit, if the rate is low, it is assumed to expect a liquidity surplus. This method to assess the liquidity situation at the interbank market can easily be justiÞed theoretically. Ho and Saunders (1985) and Spindt and Hoffmeister (1988) for example discuss models of the Fed funds market, while Välimäki (2001) , Quirós and Mendizábal (2001) and Tapking (2002) analyse models of the European interbank market. In all of these models, the equilibrium rate is the higher the more likely a liquidity deÞcit is. However, most of these models are general equilibrium models and thus based on the assumption that all banks take the interbank rate as given.
At least in Europe, transactions at the interbank market are usually agreed on in direct negotiations between banks, often on the telephone. Sometimes, brokers are involved to help banks to Þnd a transaction partner, but the terms of transactions, i.e. interest rates and transaction volumes, are still a matter of negotiations between the banks.
2 Therefore, one may question whether a general equilibrium model with interest rates taking banks is an appropriate model of the interbank market. Consequently, one may ask whether the overnight interbank market rate is still a good indicator for the liquidity situation at the interbank market, if banks do not take interest rates as given but determine interest rates and transaction volumes in negotiations. The latter question is exactly what we are going to address in this paper.
Why do we have doubts that the overnight rate is a good indicator of the liquidity situation at the interbank market if banks determine the terms 1 of transactions in negotiations? Consider for example two banks that provisionally agree that the Þrst will lend a certain amount of liquidity to the second at a certain interest rate. If the banks now receive new information that indicate that a liquidity deÞcit is more likely than previously expected, we might expect the banks to agree to adjust the terms of their transaction. But what kind of new agreement will they choose? They maybe agree to leave the transaction volume as it is, but raise the interest rate. However, it also appears to be possible that they agree to leave the interest rate as it is, but reduce the transaction volume. In the latter case, changes in the expectations would not lead to changes in the interest rates.
To put forward this idea in a precise and consistent way, we consider a model of an interbank market with institutional characteristics similar to those of the European interbank market. 3 We look at only one so called maintenance period which lasts two days. With the beginning of the Þrst day of the maintenance period, each bank starts with an initial endowment of liquidity (i.e. deposits on accounts with the central bank). With the beginning of the second day, banks face a random inßux or drain of liquidity. The central bank requires each bank to hold on average a certain amount of liquidity at each day of the maintenance period on a so called minimum reserve account with the central bank. On the last day of the maintenance period, banks can lend liquidity to the central banks deposit facility and they can borrow liquidity from the central banks marginal lending facility. The interest rate paid for lending into the deposit facility is called deposit rate, the rate for borrowing from the marginal lending facility is the marginal lending rate. Both facility rates are Þxed by the central bank. The marginal lending rate is higher than the deposit rate. On both days of the maintenance period, banks can borrow liquidity from other banks and lend liquidity to other banks. Thus, each banks that has less liquidity at its disposal at the beginning of the second day than remaining reserve requirements at that day must borrow liquidity either from the central bank's marginal lending facility or from other banks at the interbank market. All other banks can lend liquidity to the central bank's deposit facility or to other banks. The objective of each bank is to maximise the (expected) liquidity it has at its disposal after the end of the maintenance period.
The crucial assumption in our model is that no bank takes interest rates as given. All banks instead negotiate multilaterally on interest rates and transaction volumes on both days of the maintenance period. The negotiations are modelled as a cooperative game and the solution concept applied is the Shapley value. Our model can therefore be described as a dynamic cooperative game. At the last day of the maintenance period, negotiations take place in which the outcome of the negotiations of the Þrst day are taken as given. In the negotiations at the Þrst day, banks take the expected outcome of the negotiations of the second day into consideration. It is of special importance that the banks do not directly negotiate on interest rates and transaction volumes. Instead, they negotiate on how to share the (maximum expected) joint liquidity of the banking industry after the end of the maintenance period. I.e. the direct outcome of the negotiations is a number for each bank (the Shapley value of the bank), which gives the bank's expected Þnal liquidity. The implicit interest rates and transaction volumes that are compatible with these numbers can then be derived. Finally, one can calculate the implicit average interest rate from these implicit interest rates and transaction volumes.
The main results of our analysis are the following: As soon as the interest rates and transaction volumes of the Þrst day of the maintenance period are given, a unique implicit average interest rate of the second day of the maintenance period can be derived from the outcome of the negotiations of the second day. However, there is a multiplicity of implicit average interest rates of the Þrst day. The average interest rate at that day can be any number between 0 and 1, no matter whether the market is expecting a liquidity deÞcit or a liquidity surplus. The average overnight interest rate at the Þrst day of the maintenance period is therefore useless as an indicator of the expected liquidity situation at the interbank market.
The reason for the multiplicity of average overnight rates is simple: If for example average rates are Þxed at a very low level and the transaction volumes are increasing, borrowing banks are normally getting better off and lending banks are getting worse off. If instead interest rates are rising and the transaction volumes are constant, borrowing banks are normally getting worse off and lending banks are getting better off. If now both the transaction volumes and the interest rates are increasing but the interest rates remain at a relatively low level, the expected proÞts of all banks may remain unchanged. That implies that there are different combinations of overnight interest rates and transaction volumes that all lead to the same expected Þnal amount of liquidity for all banks. Since both the overnight rates and the transaction volumes are directly determined by the banks and all banks are indifferent between these combinations, they are all compatible with the assumptions of our model.
Note that the Shapley value has often been used as a solution concept for models of exchange economies. The Shapley value has been introduced and justiÞed axiomatically by Shapley (1953) . A textbook treatment of the Shapley value can be found for example in Myerson (1991) and Eichberger (1993) . Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) give a noncooperative justiÞcation of the Shapley value as a bargaining solution concept. First applications of the Shapley value as an equilibrium concept for exchange economies with transferable utility are Shapley (1964) and Aumann and Shapley (1974) , especially chapter 6. 4 In the wake of these contributions, many articles have been published which analyse the relation between the general equilibrium of an exchange economy and the core and Shapley value of the related cooperative game, the so called market game.
5 See chapter A and B in Mertens and Sorin (1994) for an overview.
In section 2, we describe our model which is analysed in the sections 3 and4. The last day of the maintenance period is considered in section 3. Going backwards, we deal with the Þrst day of the maintenance period in section 4. In section 5, we try to test empirically a hypothesis that can be motivated by our theoretical Þndings. We show that the empirical results crucially depend on how expectations are approximated empirically.
The model
In this section, we formally describe the main institutional assumptions used in our model. Our assumptions on how prices and transaction volumes are determined in multilateral negotiations among banks will be exposed in later sections. We consider a set I = {1, ..., n} of n banks and only one maintenance period lasting for only two days t = 1 and t = 2. Moreover, we assume that all borrowing and lending of liquidity has a maturity of only one day. 4 A recent discussion of Aumann and Shapley (1974) can be found in Butnariu and Klement (1996) . 5 This literature has well established that under quite general conditions the utility allocation of the general equilibrium is the unique element of the core of the related market game and coincides with its Shapley value, if no player has signiÞcant market power (inÞnite and non-atomic player sets).
Finally, a day in our model will be thought of as a point of time rather than a period of time.
Let A i,t ≥ 0 be the reserves that bank i holds on its minimum reserve account with the central bank from t to t+1 (t = 1, 2). We assume that bank i has to satisfy A i,1 + A i,2 ≥ m i , i.e. m i is the bank's (exogenous and aggregated, i.e. not average) minimum reserve requirement for the maintenance period under consideration. The central bank pays no interest on reserves so that bank i holds not more reserves with the central bank than necessary, thus
On day t = 1, bank i starts with an initial endowment L i of liquidity.
On both days of the maintenance period, banks can go to the interbank market to lend liquidity to or borrow liquidity from other banks. Let F j i,t be the liquidity bank j borrows from bank i from t to t + 1 and r j i,t the corresponding interest rate, i.e. by deÞnition we have F In t = 2, bank i realizes a random and exogenous liquidity inßux g i which may be positive or negative. The term g i is mainly driven by customers of bank i paying in or withdrawing money from their account. Moreover, g i comprises for example liquidity drains because of dividend payments, payouts of factor income and real investments.
In t = 2, the banks can lend a liquidity surplus to and borrow a liquidity deÞcit from the central bank's standing facilities. The liquidity lent by bank i to the central bank via the deposit facility is D i , the liquidity borrowed from the central bank via the marginal lending facility is S i . The deposit rate is r D and the marginal lending rate is r S (r S > r D ). We assume both rates to be exogenous and non-random. The banks have no access to standing facilities in t = 1. This assumption is of course not in accordance with the reality at the European interbank market where banks can go to the ECB's standing facilities on every day. But it can be shown that only under quite extreme parameter constellations the banks in our model would use the standing facilities in t = 1, if we additionally assumed that they had access to them on every day of the maintenance period. The assumption that banks can go to the standing facilities only on the last day of the maintenance period is thus quite harmless and simpliÞes our analysis signiÞcantly.
From the assumptions described so far, we can derive several identity equations. In t = 1, each bank can use its initial endowment either to fulÞl reserve requirements or to lend it to other banks at the interbank market. We therefore have
The liquidity bank i can dispose of in t = 2 is given by
or, from the expenditure side, by
Finally, bank i's liquidity after the end of the maintenance period, i.e. at day t = 3, is
Note that L i,3 is the Þnal value of bank i's activity at the interbank market in the maintenance period under consideration. This is because we assume that no endogenous liquidity drains occur during the maintenance period, but the whole liquidity surplus is reinvested according to equations 3 and 4. Therefore, we assume that bank i's objective at day t, t = 1, 2, is to maximise
.e. its in t expected liquidity after the end of the maintenance period.
In the next two sections, we analyse the banks' behaviour at the interbank market. We consider the interaction between several banks at the interbank market as a cooperative game. Banks are not price taker, but negotiate multilaterally with each other on interest rates and amounts of liquidity lent and borrowed. The main analytical concept used is the Shapley value. To begin with, we consider the last day of the maintenance period.
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On the last day of the maintenance period t = 2, each bank i has to satisfy A i,2 = m i − A i,1 , where A i,1 is given. Thus, A i,2 is given and each bank has to decide only on its recourse to the facilities (D i and S i ) and its activities at the interbank market. The terms of deals at the interbank market are determined in multilateral negotiations. The payoff some bank i obtains on the basis of these negotiations in t = 2 is its Shapley value and will be denoted by L * i,3 . To determine the Shapley value for each bank, we Þrst have to go through some hypothetical considerations on coalition behaviour.
Let ρ = I 2 denote the set of all subsets of I. Each k ∈ ρ is called a possible coalitions of banks. Coalitions are to be thought of as follows: Each bank can take part in exactly one coalition per day. If some bank i is in coalition k on day t = 2, it can only borrow from and lend to those banks on that day which are also in k. Thus, for some coalition k on day t = 2 we have
Denote by x i bank i's liquidity surplus in t = 2. It is deÞned by
Now assume that the members of coalition k would act such that they maximise the sum of the payoffs of all banks in k, if coalition k were formed in t = 2. They would then choose D i , S i , F j i,2 and r j i,2 for all i ∈ k and j ∈ I to maximise
subject to
The solution of the above maximization problem leads to a value for v k,2 that we denote by v * k,2 . The function that assigns the value v * k,2 to each possible coalition k ∈ ρ is called the characteristic function. It is needed in order to determine the Shapley value for a given bank.
Since recourse to both facilities on the same day is never optimal for a given coalition, the solution to the above problem has to satisfy (1)
With this, we get from equation 5
where
as the obvious solution of the above problem. Equation 7 gives us the characteristic function of our cooperative game in t = 2.
Since we know the characteristic function now, we can apply common equilibrium concepts of cooperative game theory like the core or the Shapley value to our problem. We are going to work with the Shapley value. Let
where #k is the number of banks in k. Bank i's Shapley value is deÞned as
The expression [v * k,2 − v * k\{i},2 ] can be interpreted as bank i's contribution to coalition k. It is the higher the more the coalition would lose if bank i drops out of the coalition. If i / ∈ k, then we of course have [v * k,2 − v * k\{i},2 ] = 0. The numbers q k are non-negative weights. Let ρ i = {k ∈ ρ|i ∈ k}. It is easy to show that P k∈ρ i q k = 1. Bank i's Shapley value is thus a weighted average of i's contributions to the various possible coalitions. We assume that the Shapley value is the payoff bank i obtains from the negotiations with the other banks at the interbank market in t = 2. For both axiomatic and non-axiomatic justiÞcations of this assumption, the reader is referred to the publications mentioned in the introduction, the most comprehensive of which is Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) .
With equation 7, we get after some rearrangements
where ρ i,j = {k ∈ ρ|i, j ∈ k} and ρ i as deÞned above. We should remain a while at equation 11. Our model predicts that trade of liquidity at the interbank market in t = 2 and recourse to the central bank's facilities in t = 2 will be such that the amount of liquidity bank i can dispose of at the Þrst day after the maintenance period is L * i,3 as given in equation 11. Note that the liquidity bank i can dispose of at that day originates either from required reserve holdings (A i,2 = m i − A i,1 ) or from the usage of x i . The last line in equation 11 obviously describes the liquidity inßux stemming from required reserve holdings. Thus, the Þrst two lines give us the liquidity originating from the usage of x i . All parts of equation 11 that drop out if r S = r D describe the impact of negotiations on L * i,3 , since interbank lending is useless if r S = r D .
Consider the extreme case that I k = 1 for all k ∈ ρ. It is easy to show that in this case we have P k∈ρ i q k I k = 1. The second line in equation 11 is obviously 0. Thus, the inßux of liquidity to bank i in t = 3 originating from the usage of x i,T is x i (1 + r D ). This is because all banks have a liquidity surplus, thus no interbank trade can take place and bank i lends its whole surplus x i to the central bank via the deposit facility. Now Þx some bank i and assume that I k = 1 for all k ∈ ρ i and I k = 0 for all k / ∈ ρ i . The Þrst line in equation 11 is still x i (1 + r D ), while the second line is now
where 0 < P k∈ρ i,j q k < 1 and x j ≤ 0 for all j 6 = i. Thus, the inßux of liquidity to bank i in t = 3 originating from the usage of x i is higher than x i (1 +r D ). This proves that bank i can now lend parts of its liquidity surplus to other banks at a rate higher than r D .
Finally assume the other two extreme cases: If I k = 0 for all k ∈ ρ (i.e. x i < 0 for all i), banks i's inßux of liquidity stemming from the usage of x i is x i (1 + r S ), since all banks have a liquidity deÞcit, thus borrowing from other banks is not possible and bank i borrows from the central bank only. If I k = 0 for all k ∈ ρ i and I k = 1 for all k / ∈ ρ i , banks i's inßux of liquidity stemming from the usage of x i is higher than x i (1 + r S ), since it can now borrow parts of its liquidity deÞcit from other banks at a rate less than r S .
Equation 11 only gives us the equilibrium liquidity bank i, i = 1, ..., n, can dispose of in t = 3. We now want to determine the underlying activities of bank i in t = 2 which lead to L * i,3 as described in equation 11. To do so, we need to solve
is given in equation 5 and the second equation in 12 is derived from equations 1, 4 and 6. Note that we do not assume r j i,2 = r 2 for all i, j ∈ I and some number r 2 . In a general equilibrium model, two different prices for a homogeneous good are impossible. However, our model is no general equilibrium but a bargaining model and we show now that different prices for the same good are not in contradiction with our assumptions.
First note that 12 has no unique solution. Consider the following case: n = 3, I {1} = 1, I k = 0 for all k ∈ ρ\{1}. In this case of only three banks, bank 1 has a liquidity surplus in t = 2, while the other two banks have a liquidity deÞcit. Moreover, the liquidity deÞcit of both bank 2 and bank 3 is higher than the liquidity surplus of bank 1. It is easy to check that the following is a solution of 12: r x 1 . This example shows that (1) there is not necessarily a unique set {r j i,2 |i, j ∈ I, i 6 = j} of equilibrium interbank rates and (2) we do not necessarily have r j i,2 = r 2 for all i, j ∈ I and some number r 2 in equilibrium. 6 To continue, we make the following symmetry assumptions for notational convenience: (1) sign(x i ) = sign(x j ) implies F j i,2 = 0 for all i, j ∈ I, i.e. two banks do not trade with each other, if both have a liquidity deÞcit or if both have a liquidity surplus. (2) P n i=1 x i ≥ 0 and
Note that R 2 is the interbank rate index, i.e. a weighted average of all interbank rates in t = 2. It is straightforward to show that 12 implies
Note that L * i,3 is uniquely given by equation 11. Thus, R 2 is unique, though r j i,2 for some i, j ∈ I is not. However, note that there is no trade at all if in case (a) we have P i∈I − x i = 0 or in (b) P i∈I + x i = 0. In both cases, R 2 is not deÞned.
We now brießy summarize the results of our cooperative game analysis of the interbank market at day t = 2. (1) There is not necessarily a unique equilibrium interbank rate for the trade of liquidity among two given banks. (2) But the equilibrium interbank rate index R 2 is unique. (3) The interbank rate in one deal can differ from the rate in another deal, thus r j i,2 6 = r l k,2 for some i, j, k, l ∈ I (i 6 = j 6 = k 6 = l) is possible. 6 Note that 12 has often no solution with r j i,2 = r 2 for all i, j ∈ I and some number r 2 . If for example n = 4, I k = 1 for all k ∈ {{1}, {2}, {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}, {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4}} and I k = 0 otherwise, than there is no solution with an equal interbank rate for all trades.
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We now consider day t = 1 and start with some introductory considerations to obtain intuition on what is going on at the Þrst day of the maintenance period. With the equations 2, 3 and 6, we easily get
If we assume that 0 < r j i,1 < 1 for all i, j ∈ I, then bank i's liquidity surplus in t = 2, i.e. x i , is decreasing in F j i,1 for all j ∈ I. The reason is the following: Lending more liquidity to other banks in t = 1 means (1) holding less reserves in t = 1, i.e. more remaining reserve requirements and thus a lower liquidity surplus in t = 2, and (2) receiving more interest from other bank and thus a higher liquidity surplus in t = 2. Effect (1) is clearly stronger than effect (2). However, what is the effect of F 
Lending to some other bank j is of course the more proÞtable for bank i, the higher r . But the right hand side of equation 15 is in principle the higher, the higher the liquidity surplus in t = 2 is. For a given r j i,1 , equation 15 is the highest if I k = 1 for all k ∈ ρ i and the lowest if I k = 0 for all k ∈ ρ i . There is a simple reason for this: The more some bank i lends to other banks in t = 1, the lower is A i,1 , the higher is its reserve requirement in t = 2 and thus the lower is its liquidity surplus in t = 2. And having a low liquidity surplus is the better the higher the liquidity surplus of the market is.
We now consider the cooperative game played in t = 1. As in day t = 2, all banks negotiate multilaterally with each other on interbank rates and on amounts of liquidity borrowed by one bank from another. To determine the outcome of these negotiations, i.e. the Shapley value, we need to determine the value v * k,1 for each possible coalition k ∈ ρ in t = 1, i.e. the characteristic function in t = 1. As for day t = 2, for any coalition k ∈ ρ we have F j i,1 = 0 for all i ∈ k, j / ∈ k. Summation of the right hand side of equation 11 for all i ∈ k after substituting A i,1 by means of the equations 1 and 2 and after rearranging with equation 9 gives X i∈k
Note that replacing x i for all i ∈ I in equation 16 by the right hand side of equation 14 leads us to a formula for P i∈k L * i,3 which contains only variables chosen in t = 1 and variables exogenously given in t = 1.
Analogously to section 3, assume now that the members of coalition k would act such that they maximise the sum of the (expected) payoffs of all banks in k, if coalition k were formed in t = 1. They would then choose F j i,1 and r j i,1 for all i ∈ k and j ∈ I to maximise
Note that v k,1 depends on variables that are chosen by banks which are not members of coalition k. Thus, coalition k maximises v k,1 given the decisions of other coalitions. But which are the other coalitions? For simplicity we 13 assume that if coalition k were formed in t = 1, there would be only one other coalition in t = 1, namely I\k. Thus, if some coalition k were formed, coalition I\k would also be formed and both coalitions would play a two player Nash game in which coalition k's payoff function is v k,1 as deÞned in problem 17 and its strategy set is described by the constraints presented in problem 17. The value v * k,1 of coalition k is its Nash equilibrium payoff in this game.
It is important to make sure that this game has an equilibrium. Firstly, note that F j i,1 = −F i j,1 for all i, j ∈ I implies P i∈k P n j=1,j6 =i F j i,1 = 0, i.e. we can simplify equation 16 accordingly. That implies that the only strategy variables for some coalition k are (1 − r j i,1 )F j i,1 for all i, j ∈ k. If we assume that the interest rates are restricted such that a ≤ r j i,1 ≤ b for some numbers a and b and all i, j ∈ k, then the strategy set of k is compact. Secondly, it is very easy to check that L * i,3 as given in equation 11 is a continuous (and piecewise linear) function in x j for all j ∈ I. Thus, v k,1 is also a continuous function in x j for all j ∈ I. Since x i is continuous in (1 − r j i,1 )F j i,1 for all j ∈ I, we know that coalition k's payoff function v k,1 is continuous in the strategy variables. It is well known that a game with a compact strategy set and a continuous payoff function for all players has at least one equilibrium in mixed strategies. 7 We can therefore be sure that the game described above has at least one equilibrium in mixed strategies. However, the payoff function is not always quasi-concave so that we cannot be sure that the game has an equilibrium in pure strategies.
For k = I, the last two lines of equation 16 are 0 and the Þrst two lines do not depend on strategy variables. Thus, we always have v *
Unfortunately, for any coalition k 6 = I, it is very hard to determine v * k,1 in general. Therefore we assume from now on that there are only n = 3 banks. This is a very simply case indeed, since there is nothing a coalition of only one bank can do so that its opponent, a coalition of two banks, has a very simple problem to solve. Moreover, we assume that there are only two states of the world s ∈ {s 1 , s 2 } with probabilities p 1 and p 2 = 1 − p 1 .
7 See for example Eichberger (1993) , page 95.
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The random parameters are determined by the states according to g 1 (s 1 ) = g 2 (s 1 ) = g 3 (s 2 ) = g and g 1 (s 2 ) = g 2 (s 2 ) = g 3 (s 1 ) = −g for some g > 0.
Moreover, we assume 2L i = m i for i = 1, 2, 3. With these assumptions it is clear that P n i=1 x i (s 1 ) = g and 
Now assume that the coalitions {1, 2} and {3} are formed. The following lemma is proved in the appendix:
The economic reason for this result is the following: If F 3,1 = 0 for j = 1, 2, the position of bank 3 in t = 2 would be less strong. For in s 1 both bank 1 and 3 would have a deÞcit and bank 2 a surplus, while in s 2 bank 2 and 3 would have a surplus and bank 1 a deÞcit.
With lemma 1 and F j 3,1 = 0 for j = 1, 2, we get from 16 and 14:
and
The situation occurring if the coalitions {1, 3} and {2} are formed is described by the following
This strategy would imply that x 1 = x 3 = 0 in the state with the highest probability, i.e. neither bank 1 nor bank 3 would need to go to the facilities in this state. 8 With lemma 2 and F j 2,1 = 0 for j = 1, 3 we get
Finally, because of symmetry we get
] and analogously to equation 10 deÞned by
where q k has been deÞned in equation 9 for all k ∈ ρ. With the characteristic function given by the equations 19 to 25 it is quite easy to determine the Shapley value for the cooperative game played in t = 1 as deÞned in equation 26:
Note that a coalition {i, j}'s choice of (1 − r j i,1 )F j i,1 could lead to a situation with for example E 1 [L * i,3 ] being lower than it would be if F j i,1 = 0. Bank i would agree on such a deal only if i and j simultaneously agree that j pays a transfer to i in t = 3 to offset the losses of bank i in a coalition with j. Thus, we have to assume that banks can agree in t = 1 on interbank payments in t = 3. However, in equilibrium such agreements will not be made.
for i = 1, 2, and
Our model implies that the in t = 1 expected liquidity bank i, i = 1, 2, 3, can dispose of in t = 3 is given by the equations 27 and 28. As explained, these expectations are the result of multilateral negotiations between the three banks in t = 1 and rational expectations of the outcome of the negotiations in t = 2.
The Þrst question we want to addressed is whether there is interbank trade in t = 1. DeÞne v We now want to derive from the equations 27 and 28 the interest rates and the credit volumes the banks have agreed on in the negotiations of day t = 1. Thus, we have to solve
for F j i,1 and r j i,1 and all i, j ∈ I. It is not hard to verify that 29 has no unique solution. From now on, we concentrate on solutions of 29 that satisfy F = r 3 1,1 . The next proposition is the main result of this section and follows directly from lemma 4, which we will introduced below and prove in the appendix:
Proposition 3 For every ω ∈]0, 1[, there is at least one solution of 29 with F This proposition states that there is no unique equilibrium interbank rate index in t = 1. The equilibrium rate index can be any number between 1 and 2. There is for instance always an equilibrium with R 1 = 1 2 (r S +r D ), i.e. with the average equilibrium rate in t = 1 being exactly in the middle between the two facility rates. This is true no matter if the market is expecting a liquidity surplus (p 1 high) or deÞcit (p 1 low). And the interbank rate index may be both low or high if there is for example an expected liquidity deÞcit. That implies that in our model, the interbank rate index R 1 does not convey any information about the expected liquidity situation in the market.
The reason for this result is the following: When negotiating with other banks in t = 1, each bank is only interested in maximising the expected liquidity it can dispose of in t = 3. Each bank is indifferent between two different constellations of interbank rates r j i,1 and amounts of liquidity borrowed and lent F j i,1 , i, j ∈ I, if both result in the same expected disposable liquidity in t = 3. Proposition 3 simply states that there are many such constellations that all lead to an expected disposable liquidity of E 1 [L * * i,3 ] for all three banks i = 1, 2, 3.
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We Þnally describe how these constellations that all solve 29 differ from each other. One might think that r (ii) For every and only for r To compensate the banks 1 and 2, r 3 1,1 has to fall when bank 3 is lending more. Thus, whether an increase in the amount borrowed by 1 and 2 has to be accompanied by a rise or by a fall in the related interest rate does not only depend on how high the interest rate is, but also on F Finally note that F
Empirical results
The interbank market with the institutional characteristics described in this paper can easily be analysed in a general equilibrium model with all banks taking (expected) interest rates as given. 10 In such a model, the interest rate follows a martingale-like process
There is empirical evidence that there are small deviations from the martingale hypothesis. Angelini (2002) and Bindseil, Weller and Wuertz (2002) for example Þnd that the EONIA rate is on average relatively high at the end of the month. However, all in all the martingale hypothesis seems to work quite well.
Nevertheless, in this section we try to deÞne an alternative hypothesis that may appear to work even better. This hypothesis is motivated by the model of this paper. To begin with, two crucial assumptions of our model should be noted. The Þrst assumption is that banks do not negotiate pairwise and successively, but multilaterally and simultaneously with each other. The second is that those banks that negotiate with each other all have the same information. There are hundreds of banks at for example the euro interbank market. It is of course hard to imagine that they all negotiate simultaneously and multilaterally and that they all have the same information. However, our model may still appear realistic if one can show that the interbank market is highly segmented so that there are many small groups of banks that maintain relations almost exclusively with members of their own group. Cocco, Gomes and Martins (2001) have shown empirically that this may indeed be the case. Focusing on the Portuguese interbank market, they Þnd that many banks trade with only a few other banks over a long period.
11 In the context of these Þndings, our model may be interpreted as the model of one of these segments instead of a model of the whole interbank market. Now look at one such segment of the interbank market. If our model is a good description of this segment, the average interest rate in this segment at the day before the last day of the maintenance period (in our model R 1 ) can in principle be any number between 0 and 1. However, banks might in reality be reluctant to agree on a zero or a one hundred percent interest rate. It appears to be more likely that they agree on an interest rate that is somehow "plausible" in the eyes of observers. The most plausible interest rates on the day before the last day of a maintenance period may be the expected (average) interest rate on the last day of the maintenance period (in our model E 1 [R 2 ]) and the mid point between the facility rates (in our model 1 2 (r D + r S )). Accordingly, we now assume that there are m segments at the interbank market. Banks in a segment negotiate and trade only with banks of the same segment. Let R s t be the average interest rate at day t in segment s. In the Þrst k segments, there is a habit to set bilateral interest rates in t = 1 (the day before the last day of the maintenance period) equal to (r D + r S ) for s = 1, ..., k. In the other segments, there is a tradition to set interest rates according to the martingale hypothesis, i.e. R
Let a s be the relative volume of segment s in the whole interbank market so that P m s=1 a s = 1. The EONIA rate in t is deÞned as
Assuming that the expected liquidity situation is similar over all segments (otherwise a new formation of segments takes place in the medium term), i.e. E 1 [R s 2 ] = c for all s = 1, ..., m and some parameter c, we get
i.e.
with a ≡ P k s=1 a s > 0 . Equation 30 is the theoretical model we want to test empirically against the martingale hypothesis a = 0.
The Þrst problem we face is how to handle E 1 [R 2 ] empirically. Two approaches have been prevailing in the literature. The Þrst simply replaces E 1 [R 2 ] by R 2 so that the econometric model is
where p stands for the respective maintenance period. The other approach replaces E 1 [R 2 ] by the so called tomorrow-next futures rate F 1 . If two banks agree in t = 1 to trade tomorrow-next at F 1 , they agree that the one bank 21 borrows from the other banks in t = 2 overnight at the rate F 1 . That leads to an alternative econometric model
To test our theoretic model by means of the two alternative econometric models, we use data from the European interbank market. There were 47 maintenance periods between January 1999 and December 2002. R 1,p is the EONIA rate on the day before the last day of maintenance period p, R 2,p is the EONIA rate on the last day of maintenance period p, r D,p and r S,p are the deposit rate and the marginal lending rate on the day before the last day of the maintenance period p and F 1,p is the tomorrow-next EONIA futures rate on the day before the last day of the maintenance period p. The tomorrow-next rate is calculated as the average rate of one-day-in-advance EONIA futures traded on the Italian e-MID platform.
Instead of estimating the restricted models of the equations 31 and 32, we estimate the unrestricted models
and test the hypotheses c 1 + c 2 = 1 and c 1 > 0. Moreover, we estimate the martingale models
and compare the goodness of Þt of these two with the models in the equations 33 and 34. The results of the OLS estimations of the four models are given in the following For all hypothesis tested, the critical value on the 5% level is at about 2.016. To begin with, we see that in the models of the equations 35 and 36 the hypothesis c 2 = 1, i.e. the martingale hypothesis cannot be rejected. However, we learn from the adjusted R 2 , the Akaike info and the Schwarz criterion that the model of equation 33 yields a better Þt than the model of equation 35 and the model of equation 34 yields a better Þt than the model of equation 36. We therefore concentrate on the Þrst two models given in the equations 33 and 34.
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The results for equation 33 clearly support our theoretical model of equation 30. Both hypothesis c 1 = 0 and c 2 = 0 can be rejected, we have b c 1 > 0 and b c 2 > 0 and we cannot reject the hypothesis c 1 + c 2 = 1. However, the results for equation 34 are less compelling. We still cannot reject the hypothesis c 1 + c 2 = 1. However, we have b c 1 < 0 and the hypothesis c 1 = 0 must be rejected.
Which of the two econometric models, equation 33 or 34, is more appropriate depends on whether R 2 or F 1 is a better proxy for E 1 [R 2 ]. Theoretically, the rate F 1 appears to be a good proxy for E 1 [R 2 ] if all banks take the futures rate as given at the futures market. However, in the light of the model of this paper, it may be questioned that F 1 ' E 1 [R 2 ] if the terms of trades at the EONIA futures market are Þxed in multilateral negotiations. In this case, R 2 might be the better proxy for E 1 [R 2 ], i.e. equation 33 is more appropriate for 12 The squared correlation between 1 2 (r S + r D ) and R 2 is 0.777. It is 0.874 between 1 2 (r S + r D ) and F 1 . Thus, there may be a multicollinearity problem in the regression of the equations 33 and 34. the model in equation 30. Empirically, however, we have no reason to believe that F 1 is a bad proxy for E 1 [R 2 ]: Estimating the mean µ of the expectation error R 2 − F 1 leads to b µ = −0.0332 with a t-statistic of t = −0.765 so that the hypothesis µ = 0 cannot be rejected.
Concluding remarks
We have discussed a model of the interbank market that is based on the assumption that banks do not take the interest rate as given, but multilaterally negotiate at each day of a two day maintenance period on interest rates and on the amount of liquidity one bank borrows from another bank. The theoretic concept we have used to model these negotiations is the Shapley value. We have shown that the implicit average interbank rate on the Þrst day of the maintenance period is not unique. It is any number between 0 and 1 and therefore conveys no information on the expected liquidity situation in the market.
One conclusion is that the market may expect a liquidity deÞcit even if the average interbank rate is exactly in the middle between the two facility rates. It could expect a liquidity deÞcit even if the average interbank rate is low and it could expect a liquidity surplus even if the average rate is high. Central bankers who believe that interbank interest rates are a matter of multilateral negotiations would therefore need to take into consideration additional information, for example information on transaction volumes, if they want to assess the liquidity situation at the interbank market.
However, whether our model is a good description of the reality is hard to say. Our empirical results crucially depend on how expectations are approximated. Estimations of an econometric model that can be motivated by our theoretical model lead to very good results if the expected interest rate on some day t is approximated by the true interest rate of that day. However, if we instead use forward rates to approximate expected rates, the empirical results do not support our econometric model.
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